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PREDATORS OR PREY: MANDATORY
LISTING OF NON-PREDATORY OFFENDERS
ON PREDATORY OFFENDER REGISTRIES
Marissa Ceglian*
It is worthy to note that what separates our society from
totalitarian states is that we take individual freedoms
seriously and will not deprive citizens of those freedoms
without strict adherence to the procedural requirements of
the law.1
INTRODUCTION
Sexual offender registration statutes have existed in the United
States since 1944.2 The primary impetus behind such statutes is to
assist law enforcement in monitoring the movements and activities
of convicted sexual offenders, should they pose any future threat to
the community.3 Currently, all states have sex offender registration
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2005; B.A., Vassar College, 2001. The
author would like to thank her parents, Nick and Chiara Ceglian, and Jeff Ratner
for their continued support, encouragement and most importantly, for their
patience.
1
Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 721 (Minn. 1999) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the serious consequences of Minnesota’s predatory
offender registration statute mandate that the defendant be accorded procedural
due process protections).
2
See Roxanne Lieb & Scott Matson, Sex Offender Registration: A Review
of State Laws, WASHINGTON STATE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (1996), at
http://www.wspp.wa.gov/crime/pdf/regsrtn.pdf. California enacted its sex
offender registration law in 1944, making it the first state to enact such
legislation. Id.
3
Klaas Kids Foundation, Megan’s Law By State, available at
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statutes mandating that convicted sex offenders comply with
certain registration requirements following their release from
confinement.4
http://www.klaaskids.org/pglegmeg.htm [hereinafter Klaas Kids] (noting that
sex offender registration laws are necessary because information contained in
registries assists public agencies in protecting public safety) (last visited Feb. 11,
2004).
4
See Colleen Miles, Just Desserts, or a Rotten Apple? Will the Ninth
Circuit’s Decision in Doe v. Otte Stand to Ensure that Convicted Sex Offenders
Are Not Excessively Punished?, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 45 (2002) (noting
that “society has determined that released sex offenders are a class of offenders
that must be watched closely by the community”). See ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-20
to -38 (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010, § 12.63.020, § 12.63.030 (Michie
2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3821 to -3827 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 1212-901 to -920 (Michie 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (Deering 2004); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 16-22-101 to -114 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-250 to -261
(2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4120 (2004); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4001 to 4017 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12
(2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-1 to 846E-9 (Michie 2003); IDAHO
CODE §§ 18-8301 to -8326 (Michie 2003); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1 to /12
(2004); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-12-1 to -14 (2003); IOWA CODE §§ 692A.1 to
.16 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4901 to -4912 (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17.510, 17.520, 17.530, 17.578 (Michie 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
15:540-549 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11221 to 11228 (West
2003); MD. CODE ANN. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 11-701- 11-721 (2003);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 178D-178Q (Law. Co-op. 2004); MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 28.721 to .732 (2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (West 2003); MISS.
CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-21 to -57 (2004); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 589.400, 589.403,
589.405, 589.407, 589.410, 589.414, 589.417, 589.420, 589.425 (2004); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to -513 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-4001 to 4013 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179D.460 (Michie 2004); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 651-B (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -19 (2004); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 29-11A-1 to -8 (Michie 2003); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168
(Consol. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.5, 14-208.6 to 14-208.6c (2004);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01 to .11
(West 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 57, §§ 581 to 589 (West 2003); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 181.592 to 181.607 (2001); 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 9791 to 9792,
9795 to 9799 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.1-1 to -20 (2003); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-400 to 23-3-530 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-31
to 22-22-41 (Michie 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to 40-39-111
(2003); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 62.01-62.14 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-27-21.5 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5401 to 5414 (2003); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 9.1-900 to 9.1-920 (Michie 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
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Minnesota enacted its Predatory Offender Registration Statute
in 1991 in response to the brutal gun-point abduction of eleven
year-old Jacob Wetterling.5 As initially enacted, Minnesota’s
statute required that persons convicted of certain enumerated childrelated offenses register as predatory offenders upon release from
confinement.6 In 1993, the legislature amended the statute to
expand the number of offenses that trigger registration.7 More
significantly, the 1993 amendments mandated registration by
individuals convicted of either an enumerated predatory offense or
an offense “arising out of the same set of circumstances” if initially
charged with an enumerated predatory offense.8
9A.44.130, 9A.44.135, 9A.44.140 (West 2004); W.VA. CODE §§ 15-12-1 to -10
(2003); WIS. STAT. § 301.45 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-301 to 7-19-307
(2003).
5
MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2003); Wayne A. Logan, Examining our
Approaches to Sex Offenders and the Law: Jacob’s Legacy: Sex Offender
Registration and Community Notification Laws, Practice, And Procedure in
Minnesota, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1287, 1289-90 (2003) (noting that Jacob
Wetterling, abducted in rural St. Joseph, Minnesota, has never been found and
his abductor still remains at large).
6
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(1) (1991). The statute mandated registration
following a conviction for kidnapping, criminal sexual conduct, solicitation of
children to engage in sexual conduct, use of minors in sexual performance, or
solicitation of children to practice prostitution. Id.
7
See MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (1993) (expanding registration to include
individuals convicted of sexual offenses with adult victims). See also Logan,
supra note 5, at 1294 (noting that State Senator Joe Bertram initiated reform
efforts to expand the category of offenses which would prompt registration).
8
MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (1993). Specifically, the 1993 Amendments
require a person to register as a predatory offender if:
1) the person was charged with a felony violation of or attempt to
violate any of the following, and convicted of that offense or of another
offense arising out of the same set of circumstances: i) murder under
section 609.185, clause (2); or ii) kidnapping under section 609.25,
involving a minor victim; or iii) criminal sexual conduct under section
609.342, subdivision 1, paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f); 609.343
subdivision 1, paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f); 609.344
subdivision 1, paragraph (c) or (d); or 609.345; subdivision 1 paragraph
(c), or (d); or 2) the person was convicted of a predatory crime as
defined in section 609.1352, and the offender was sentenced as a
patterned sex offender or the court found on its own motion or that of
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The Eighth Circuit, in Gunderson v. Hvass, interpreted the
1993 amendments, holding that a defendant cleared of predatory
offense charges was nonetheless required to register as a predatory
offender.9 Although extensive forensic evidence failed to
substantiate any allegations of sexual assault, the Eighth Circuit
upheld Gunderson’s registration requirement because it determined
that his ultimate conviction for third-degree assault arose out of the
same set of circumstances as the initially charged predatory
offense.10
This note analyzes the constitutional problems inherent in
mandating registration as a predatory offender when an individual
has never been convicted of a sexual offense. Part I analyzes the
court’s holding and rationale in Gunderson. Part II provides
background on state registration laws with a focus on the
continuing expansion of Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Statute.
Part III addresses the substantive and procedural due process
challenges to Minnesota’s registration statute. Part IV addresses
other consequences of Minnesota’s registration statute, including
the unfettered discretion conferred on the prosecution and the
eventual decline of plea bargaining.11 Given the due process
concerns raised by Minnesota’s statute, Part V proposes that if a
defendant has never been convicted of a sexual offense,
registration should be discretionary following a hearing in which
the defendant is provided an opportunity to present evidence and
call witnesses to challenge his inclusion on a sex offender registry.
the prosecutor that the crime was part of a predatory pattern of behavior
that had criminal sexual conduct as its goal.
Id.
9

Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
2004 U.S. LEXIS 364 (2004) (upholding Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711
(Minn. 1999), which held that a defendant cleared of predatory offense charges
is required to register as a predatory offender under Minnesota Statute §243.166
because he was convicted of a non-predatory offense which arose out of the
same set of circumstances as the charged predatory offense).
10
Id. at 641-42.
11
State v. Newell, 2002 Minn. App. Lexis 1153 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
(noting “the enormity of the potential unchecked power this statute, as written,
places in the hands of the prosecution who has sole control over which offense
to charge”).
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This reform safeguards a defendant’s constitutional right to contest
the imposition of this stigmatizing label in an adversarial
proceeding while still effectuating the primary purpose of the
statute—to protect society from predatory offenders.
I.

GUNDERSON V. HVASS

On August 6, 2003, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision in Gunderson v. Hvass, holding that a defendant
who was cleared of all sexual assault charges nonetheless was
required to register as a predatory offender.12 While noting that
Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Statute could produce “unfair
results,” the Eighth Circuit discerned no constitutional
impediments in affirming the district court’s holding that an
individual dismissed of sexual assault charges must register as a
sexual offender.13 Minnesota’s statute requires individuals
convicted of only a non-predatory offense to register as a predatory
offender if the non-predatory offense “arises out of the same set of
circumstances” as the originally charged predatory offense.14
Therefore, although only convicted of assault in the third degree,
Brian Gunderson was required to register as a sexual offender
because the court determined, based solely on the allegations
contained in the criminal complaint, that his assault conviction
arose out of the same circumstances as an initial charge for firstdegree criminal sexual conduct.15
12

Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 641; MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2003).
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 645 (noting that the statute and relevant
precedent mandate that a defendant charged with both a predatory and a nonpredatory offense who proceeds to trial and is acquitted of the predatory offense
but convicted of the non-predatory offense must still register as a predatory
offender).
14
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(a)(1) (2003).
15
Gunderson, 339 F.3d. at 642. See Minnesota v. Kemmer, 2001 Minn.
App. LEXIS 379 (Minn. App. 2001) (holding that when it is clear that the
charged offense and the offense to which the accused pled guilty “involved the
same victim and occurred on the same date at the same place,” then the two
offenses are deemed to have arisen from the same set of circumstances). Here,
because Gunderson’s charged offense and the offense to which he pled guilty
involved the same victim and occurred at the same place and on the same date,
13
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The original complaint charging Gunderson with a sexual
offense arose out of an incident involving a woman he met at a
bar.16 The complainant alleged that Gunderson sexually assaulted
her after driving her home.17 Gunderson consistently denied any
sexual contact with the victim although he admitted that a physical
altercation occurred.18 Forensic tests on biological samples from
the victim corroborated Gunderson’s account.19 Based on this
forensic evidence, the original complaint, which charged
Gunderson with a sexual offense, was dismissed in its entirety.20 A
new complaint was filed against Gunderson, charging him with
third-degree assault from the same incident.21 Gunderson pled
guilty to the new complaint.22 During his plea allocution, however,
Gunderson was not informed of his duty to register as a predatory
offender.23 Indeed, he was not made aware of his duty to register as
a predatory offender until he was later incarcerated for a violation
of probation less than a year after his conviction.24
Gunderson subsequently filed suit in the Minnesota district
court, alleging that the statute requiring him to register as a sexual
offender was an unconstitutional violation of his substantive and
procedural due process rights.25 The district court, however,
the court determined that the two offenses arose out of the same set of
circumstances. Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 641-42.
16
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 641. The incident is alleged to have occurred
March 31, 1998. Id.
17
Id. The complainant claimed that Gunderson took off her pants while
punching her and holding her arms and then had non-consensual sexual
intercourse with her and ejaculated inside her vagina. Id. at 641.
18
Id. (noting that additional laboratory reports conducted by the Minnesota
Bureau of Criminal Apprehension did not detect the presence of semen from
physical examinations of the victim).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2003).
22
Id. Gunderson was placed on probation for three years and received a
stayed sentence of fifteen months imprisonment. Id. at 641-42.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 642.
25
Id. Gunderson argued that registration as a predatory offender implicates
a fundamental right, specifically, the presumption of innocence, and therefore
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concluded that Gunderson’s registration under Minnesota’s
Predatory Offender Registration Statute did not violate
Gunderson’s constitutional rights.26 The district court determined
that the registration requirements were not violative of
Gunderson’s procedural due process rights because of the minimal
burdens imposed on registrants and because the fundamental right
to a presumption of innocence is only implicated in criminal
statutes and not regulatory laws like the registration statute.27 The
court then determined that the registration requirement was
properly applied to a defendant charged with both predatory and
non-predatory offenses who pleads guilty only to a non-predatory
offense.28
In affirming the district court’s finding that Gunderson was
required to register as a predatory offender, the Eighth Circuit
relied on the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Boutin v. La
Fleur.29 In Boutin, the court interpreted the “arising out of the
same set of circumstances” phrase of the Minnesota statute to
require the registration of a defendant convicted of a non-sexual
offense if the non-sexual offense arose out of the same set of
circumstances as a charged predatory offense.30 Defendant
his substantive due process rights were violated. Id. Additionally, Gunderson
asserted that he had a protectible liberty interest in not registering. Gunderson v.
Hvass, No. Civ. 01-646, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18674 (D. Minn. 2002).
26
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 641.
27
Gunderson v. Hvass, No. Civ. 01-646, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18674, at
*4-5 (D. Minn. 2002).
28
Id. at *6.
29
591 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 1999). This case was the first to examine the
1993 Amendments to Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Statute. Id.
30
Id. at 716. Predatory offenses include murder while committing or
attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first-degree or seconddegree with force or violence; kidnapping; criminal sexual conduct in the first,
second, third, fourth and fifth (felony only) degree; felony indecent exposure;
false imprisonment of a minor; soliciting a minor to engage in prostitution or
sexual conduct; using a minor in a sexual performance; and possessing
pornographic work involving minors. MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(a)(1)-(2) (2003).
See also Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, 2000 Predatory Offender
Registration Tracking Program: Offenses Requiring Registration, available at
http://www.dps.state.mn.us/bca/Invest/Documents/Offenses%20
Requiring%0Registration.pdf.
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Timothy Boutin was charged with two counts of criminal sexual
conduct in the third degree, one count of assault in the third degree,
and one count of misdemeanor assault in the third degree.31
Boutin’s charges stemmed from allegations made by Denise
Rathman, Boutin’s girlfriend, that he physically abused her and
forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.32 Boutin admitted
that he had non-consensual sexual intercourse with Rathman,
stating that “she didn’t want to and I still did it I guess.”33 Because
Rathman later recanted her allegations of sexual assault, Boutin
pled guilty to third-degree assault.34 Although the criminal sexual
conduct charges were dismissed against Boutin, Boutin was
nevertheless required to register as a predatory offender.35 The
Supreme Court affirmed the registration requirement because
Boutin was initially charged with an enumerated predatory offense
which arose out of the same set of circumstances as the charged
predatory offense.36
Gunderson sought to factually distinguish Boutin’s case from
his own, noting that his conviction arose from a complaint which
charged only a non-sexual offense while Boutin’s conviction arose
from a complaint which charged both a predatory and a nonpredatory offense.37 The court summarily dismissed Gunderson’s
argument, holding that the statute does not demand that a nonpredatory offense be charged in the same complaint as a predatory
offense; it demands only that the conviction arise from the same
set of circumstances as an enumerated predatory offense.38 Here,
since both offenses occurred on the same date, at the same place,
and involved the same victim, the court found that Gunderson’s
conviction for third-degree assault arose out of the same set of
circumstances as his initial charge for first-degree criminal sexual

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 713.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 716.
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 641. See supra text accompanying notes 15-21.
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 642-43.
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conduct.39
The court next addressed Gunderson’s constitutional
challenges to the statute.40 First, the court determined that the
statute was not violative of Gunderson’s substantive due process
rights because no fundamental right was implicated.41 In a
substantive due process analysis, if a fundamental right is
implicated, the state must advance a legitimate and compelling
governmental interest for interfering with that right.42 If no
fundamental right is implicated, then the standard of review is
“less exacting” and the statute will be upheld so long as it was
determined to be rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose.43 While noting the presumption of innocence to be a
fundamental right, the court concluded that such a right is only
implicated in either a criminal or punitive law, not a regulatory
law.44 No fundamental right was implicated because the
registration statute was found to be non-punitive.45 Therefore, to
withstand any constitutional challenge, the statute only needed to
be rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.46 Here,
39

Id. at 643. But see Murphy v. Wood, 545 N.W.2d 52, 53-54 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that a factual record was necessary to determine whether
defendant’s sexual assault charge arose out of the same set of circumstances as
his conviction for aggravated robbery and assault).
40
See Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 643.
41
Id. at 643-44. See discussion infra Part III.B.
42
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 643-44.
43
Id. at 643. “In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is
any reasonably conceivable basis for the classification.” F.C.C. v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
44
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 643. See State v. Edwards, 130 N.W.2d 623, 626
(Minn. 1964) (noting that while the Constitution has not expressly provided the
presumption of innocence to be a fundamental right, courts have treated it as
such).
45
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 643 (citing Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711,
717 (Minn. 1999) (holding that the registration statute was non-punitive given
that registration as a predatory offender is not a permanent requirement and that
it does not restrict a registrant’s ability to change residences or to move out of
state)).
46
Id.
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the court found the registration statute was rationally related to the
government’s legitimate interest in requiring all predatory
offenders to register, “including those who take advantage of
favorable plea agreements.”47
Second, the court dismissed Gunderson’s claim that
Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Statute violated his
procedural due process rights.48 While the court conceded that
Gunderson’s reputation would undoubtedly be injured by
mandating his registration as a sexual offender, the court noted that
reputation, alone, is insufficient “to invoke the procedural
protections of the due process clause.”49 Reputational harm must
be coupled with another tangible element to rise to the level of a
protectible property interest.50 The court reasoned that the
requirements of Minnesota’s registration statute posed only a
minimal burden on the registrant.51 The court noted that the initial
registration process would require only that Gunderson provide his
fingerprints, a photograph, and information about his whereabouts

47

Id. at 643 (quoting U.S. Magistrate Judge Raymond L. Erickson’s report
to the district court, Gunderson v. Hvass, No. 01-646, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21783, at *25 (D. Minn. 2002)). In his report, the Magistrate Judge commented:
Given the realities of the plea bargaining system, by extending the
registration requirements to persons who are charged with a predatory
offense, but plead guilty to a non-predatory charge that arises from the
same circumstances, the Minnesota Legislature was attempting to
insure the inclusion in the registration rolls, of all predatory offenders,
including those who take advantage of favorable plea agreements. The
fact that such a registration policy may, in fact, require the inclusion of
persons who are not predators, is not a fatal Constitutional defect.
Gunderson v. Hvass, No. 01-646, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21783, at *25 (D.
Minn. June 10, 2002) [hereinafter Magistrate’s Report].
48
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 644. See discussion infra Part III.A.
49
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 644.
50
Id. As identified in the Magistrate’s Report, if reputational harm is
coupled with a change in legal status, if State or Federal employment is denied,
or if entitlements under State or Federal law are diminished as a result of the
registration requirement, then a registrant has identified a protectible property
interest. Magistrate’s Report, supra note 47, at *42. See discussion infra Part
III.A.2.
51
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 644.
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to local law enforcement;52 Gunderson’s only obligation thereafter
would be to update his address information annually.53 Therefore,
because Gunderson failed to identify a protectible property
interest, the court rejected his procedural due process claim.54
Finding no viable due process challenges to the statute, the court
affirmed Gunderson’s obligation to register as a predatory
offender.55
II. OVERVIEW OF STATE SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION
STATUTES
The majority of states enacted sexual offender registration laws
after Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
52

Id.
Id.
54
Id. at 645. Justice Beam was the only judge to issue a separate opinion
from the majority. In his concurrence, he noted that although the police
investigation clearly established a lack of sexual contact between Gunderson and
the complainant, and that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Boutin
would seem to “turn reason and fairness on its head,” he nonetheless agreed with
the court that Gunderson asserted no Fourteenth Amendment due process
violation. Id.
55
Id. Gunderson’s duty to register as a predatory offender requires him to
register all primary addresses, all secondary addresses, the addresses of all
Minnesota property owned, leased or rented by him, the addresses of all
locations where he is employed, the addresses of all residences where he resides
when attending school, and the make, model, license plate number, and color of
all vehicles owned or regularly driven by him. MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4a(b)(1)(6) (2003). He must provide law enforcement with a fingerprint card, a
photograph, and a written consent form allowing a treatment facility to release
information to law enforcement. MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4(a). He must also
notify law enforcement five days before each residence change. MINN. STAT. §
243.166.3(b) Additionally, he must register as a predatory offender in every
other state where he works or attends school. MINN. STAT. § 243.166.3(d).
Gunderson must update his information annually. MINN. STAT. §
243.166.4(e)(3). Violation of any of these provisions constitutes a felony, which
carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison. MINN. STAT. §
243.166.5(a)-(b). While Minnesota does not automatically provide for the public
dissemination of Gunderson’s registration, if he is not in compliance with the
registration provisions for over thirty days, his personal information and a
photograph may be released to the public. MINN. STAT. § 243.166.7a.
53
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Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act.56 This
Act, part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, encourages states to create registries of offenders
convicted of crimes against children or sexually violent offenses.57
The Act provides that if a state fails to create a registry within
three years of its enactment, the state loses ten percent of its
federal crime control grant funds.58 Additionally, states that create
registries of sexually violent offenders are awarded grants by the
Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance to offset the costs of
complying with the registration program.59
The Jacob Wetterling Act provides states with a “minimum
baseline” for their registration programs.60 States are free to
impose, and indeed have imposed, more rigorous provisions when
56

42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2003). See Lieb, supra note 2 (noting that several
states enacted sex offender registration laws prior to Congress’ passage of the
Jacob Wetterling Act). California enacted the nation’s first registration law in
1944. Id. Following California, Arizona enacted its registration law in 1951,
although this law was repealed and later replaced. Id. Between 1957-1967,
Florida, Nevada, Ohio; and Alabama followed suit, enacting their own
registration statutes. Id.
57
See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); see also 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(1)(A)-(B)
(2003) (mandating that the Attorney General establish guidelines for state
programs that require registration of individuals convicted of criminal offenses
against a minor or those convicted of a sexually violent offense). See Caroline
Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right
to Privacy and Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 94
(1996). The provision of the Act that required sex offenders to register upon
release from confinement received overwhelming support from both Democrats
and Republicans. Id.
58
42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(1)-(2) (2003). The statute provides that the
Attorney General may extend the deadline for compliance by two years for any
“state that is making a good faith effort to implement” the registry. Id.
59
42 U.S.C. § 14071(i)(1)(A) (2003). Such funds are distributed directly to
the state and are to be used for training, salaries, equipment, materials, and other
costs. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(i)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (2003).
60
Wayne A. Logan, A Study in “Actuarial Justice”: Sex Offender
Classification Practice and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593, 599 (2000)
(noting that the Jacob Wetterling Act “constitute[s] a floor for state programs,
not a ceiling”).
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enacting their own sex offender registries.61 The Act provides that
“a determination of whether a person is a sexually violent
predator . . . shall be made by a court after considering the
recommendation of a board composed of experts in the behavior
and treatment of sex offenders, victims’ rights advocates and
representatives of law enforcement agencies.”62 States, however,
may waive this requirement if they have established equally or
more rigorous alternate procedures or legal standards for
designating an individual as a sexually violent predator.63 At
minimum, a state registration program must require each registrant
to 1) provide local law enforcement officials with the registrant’s
name, address, a photograph, and fingerprints;64 2) report any
change in address and notify proper authorities of any intention to
move to another state; and 3) register in the state where he is
employed or attending school.65 Finally, each registrant must read
and sign a document informing him of his duty to register as either
a sexually violent offender or an offender convicted of crimes
against children.66 Registration is required for ten years.67 Lifetime
registration, however, is mandated for any individual either
classified as a sexually violent predator or convicted of an
aggravated offense.68
61

Id. (noting that states may “broaden the list of eligible offense categories,
lengthen the mandated registration period, and impose other measures more
stringent than required by the Wetterling Act”). While the Jacob Wetterling Act
specifies that information concerning sex offenders must be released to the
public, states retain discretion in determining the method and extent of
registration information that is released to the public. Id.
62
See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(2)(A) (2003).
63
See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(2)(B) (2003); see also 42 U.S.C. §
14071(a)(3)(C) (defining the term “sexually violent predator” as a person
convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in
predatory sexually violent offenses).
64
See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(1)(A)(ii),(iv), (B) (2003); Logan, supra note
60, at 599.
65
42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2003).
66
Id. § 14071(b)(1)(A)(v).
67
Id. § 14071(b)(6)(A).
68
Id. § 14071(b)(6)(ii)—(iii). “The term ‘sexually violent predator’ means
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A. States’ Approaches to Registration under the Jacob
Wetterling Act

The federal guidelines imposed by the Jacob Wetterling Act
produced varying state approaches to registration.69 States differ as
to the extent to which the public can access information contained
in the registry.70 For example, Florida, New York, and California
have created hotlines where callers can obtain information
regarding registered sex offenders.71 In over thirty states,
information concerning registrants is disseminated via the
internet,72 and in Washington, D.C., such information can be
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely
to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.” See supra note 63. Id. §
14071(a)(3)(c). An individual commits aggravated sexual abuse when he
knowingly uses force or threat of force to cause another to engage in a sexual
act. 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2004).
69
Doe v. Williams, 167 F. Supp. 2d 45, 47 (D.D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that
because the Jacob Wetterling Act established only minimum standards, states
have differed in their statutory approaches to registration and community
notification).
70
Carol L. Kunz, Toward Dispassionate, Effective Control of Sexual
Offenders, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 453, 458 (1997) (noting that the flexibility of the
Jacob Wetterling Act has led to diversity among state registration and
notification statutes and that state notification statutes vary “in terms of . . . the
scope of . . . notification, and the manner in which this process is carried out”).
71
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 290.4 (Deering 2004) (permitting “the
department to operate a ‘900’ telephone number [so] that members of the public
may call and inquire whether a named individual” is contained in the registry);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(6)(k)(2) (West 2003) (authorizing the department “to
disseminate this public information by any means deemed appropriate, including
operating a toll-free telephone number for this purpose”); N.Y. CORRECT LAW §
168-p (Consol. 2003) (establishing a “900” telephone number so the public may
call and inquire whether a named individual is required to register).
72
Kimberly B. Wilkins, Sex Offender Registration and Community
Notification Laws: Will These Laws Survive?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1245 (2003)
(noting that thirty-two states make their registries available on the internet). See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.087(g) (2003) (requiring the Department of Public
Safety to post on the internet a list of offenders who have failed to register,
whose addresses cannot be verified or who otherwise cannot be located); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. § 26 (2003) (establishing Delaware’s Sex Offender Registry
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obtained through local law enforcement agencies.73 In certain
states, including Minnesota, access is more restricted.74
State laws also vary as to the length of registration. For
example, Florida requires lifetime registration for all “sexual
predators” while Maine and Minnesota provide for a ten-year
registration period.75 The penalties for non-compliance also vary
between states.76
Additionally, state registration statutes vary as to whether

Internet Web Site, which allows the general public to receive updates by
geographical region whenever a sex offender is added to, deleted from, or has
any change in status on the registry).
73
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-22-112(2) (2003) (authorizing local law
enforcement agencies to release to any person residing within the agency’s
jurisdiction information regarding any person registered with the local law
enforcement agency); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4011(a)-(B) (2003) (allowing the
Metropolitan Police Department to make registration lists and information about
registrants available for public inspection at police stations); S.C. CODE ANN. §
23-3-490(a) (Law. Co-op. 2002) (making information collected for the registry
open to public inspection, upon request to the county sheriff).
74
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-3(d) (Michie 2003). Hawaii does not
provide for automatic release of registration information. Id. The state must first
petition for release of information in a civil proceeding. Id. At this hearing, the
offender has the opportunity to present evidence to show that he is not a threat to
the community and that the public release of his information is not necessary to
the safety of the community. Id. Like Hawaii, Minnesota does not provide for
automatic dissemination of information contained in the registry. See MINN.
STAT. § 243.166.7 (2003) (providing that registration information is considered
“private data” and may only be used for law enforcement purposes).
75
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3821 (2003) (requiring lifetime registration
after a conviction for sexual conduct with a minor); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
775.21(6)(l) (West 2003) (requiring lifetime registration for sexual predators);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-2 (Michie 2003) (requiring compliance with
registration requirements for the lifetime of the offender); 34-A ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 11225 (2003) (requiring sex offenders to register for a period of ten
years from the initial date of registration).
76
See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-t (Consol. 2003) (treating a first offense
as class A misdemeanor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.11 (2003) (treating any
violation for non-compliance as a Class F felony); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-470
(b)(1) (Law Co-op. 2002) (treating a first offense as a misdemeanor with a
mandatory sentence of ninety days incarceration).
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registration is compulsory or discretionary.77 In Massachusetts, a
state which employs discretionary classification, anyone convicted
of a sex crime is entitled to a hearing before a Sex Offender
Registry Board, where the offender can argue against inclusion on
the registration list.78 In contrast, nineteen states including
Minnesota employ compulsory classification, whereby a court
must classify a defendant as a sexual predator if the defendant
satisfies the specified criteria in the statute.79 In states requiring
compulsory classification, the court does not have the ability to
modify the person’s duty to register.80 Alaska, a state that employs
the compulsory approach, has rationalized this approach, finding
“the fact of an offender’s conviction for a sex offense . . . sufficient
reason to include that offender in the registry because of the
potential for re-offense.”81
States also differ with respect to the range of offenses that will
trigger registration.82 The Jacob Wetterling Act specifies that states
77

See Logan, supra note 60, at 603.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6 § 178K (2004); see Turner, John C., Megan’s
Law: Safety Net or Noose?, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1999. In determining
whether to relieve the registrant of his duty to register, the Sex Offender
Registry Board shall consider whether the offender’s criminal history indicates a
risk of re-offense or a danger to the public as well as whether any physical harm
was caused by the offense and whether the offense involved consensual conduct
between adults. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6 § 178K (2)(d) (2004).
79
Logan, supra note 60, at 603 (noting that Alabama, Alaska, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia all employ compulsory classification of
sex offenders).
80
See MINN. STAT. § 243.166.2 (2003) (stating that “the Court may not
modify the person’s duty to register in the pronounced sentence or deposition
order”).
81
Logan, supra note 60, at 605. Similarly, Alabama provides that “certain
juveniles and all adults convicted of a ‘criminal sex offense,’ are subject to
compulsory registration and community notification by means of a ‘notification
flyer,’ which is distributed by hand or regular mail by police.” Id. See ALA.
CODE 15-20-21(3) (2003).
82
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (2003) (mandating registration for
the following offenses: sexual perversion involving a member of the same or
opposite sex, sexual abuse involving any member of the same or opposite sex,
78
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may impose registration for sexually violent offenses that include
or exceed aggravated sexual abuse or any offense that involves
“engaging in physical contact with another with the intent to
commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse.”83 Consequently,
states have composed varying lists of enumerated offenses that
require registration.84 A minority of states demand registration if
the defendant’s offense was “sexually motivated” or committed for
a sexual purpose.85
B. Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Act
In 1991, Minnesota became the fifteenth state to enact a sex
offender registration statute.86 Although several senators
“expressed concern that registration was contrary to the idea that
released offenders had paid their debt to society” and “tends to
rape, sodomy, sexual misconduct, indecent exposure, promoting prostitution in
the first or second degree, obscenity, incest, or an attempt to commit any of
these crimes); IOWA CODE § 692A.2 (2003) (mandating registration for any
individual who has been convicted of a criminal offense against a minor, an
aggravated offense, sexual exploitation or a sexually violent offense); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9795.1(a)(1)-(2) (2003) (mandating ten year registration for the
following offenses: kidnapping a minor, indecent assault, incest where the
victim is between the ages of twelve and eighteen, promoting prostitution of a
minor, obscenity where the victim is a minor, sexual abuse of children, unlawful
contact with a minor, and sexual exploitation of children or any attempt to
commit these offenses). Lifetime registration is required for rape, involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, incest
where the victim is under twelve years-old, and sexually violent predators. 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.1(b)(2)-(3) (2003).
83
42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(B) (2003).
84
See Logan, supra note 60, at 599 (noting that states may expand the
categories of offenses that mandate registration).
85
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(2)(E) (Deering 2004) (mandating
registration if the crime is committed for “purposes of sexual gratification”);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(c)(14) (2002) (requiring registration for “any act
which at the time of sentencing for the offense has been determined beyond a
reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated”); W. VA. CODE § 15-12-2(c)
(2003) (demanding registration if the offense was “sexually motivated”).
86
Logan, supra note 5, at 1293 (noting that Minnesota was a “forerunner
with respect to sex offender registration and community notification). See MINN.
STAT. § 243.166 (2003).
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deprive people of their freedom of movement and freedom of
privacy,” the Predatory Offender Registration Act passed
Minnesota’s House and the Senate by a commanding majority.87
The original version of the Act mandated registration if an offender
had been convicted of any of the following child-related offenses:
kidnapping a minor; criminal sexual conduct toward a minor;
solicitation of children to engage in sexual conduct; use of minors
in a sexual performance; or solicitation of children to practice
prostitution.88 Any violation for non-compliance was considered a
misdemeanor.89
The 1993 amendments to Minnesota’s Predatory Offender
Registration Statute considerably expanded the range of offenses
that require registration.90 Significantly, the amended law
mandates registration if an individual is “charged with a felony
violation” or an “attempt to violate” an enumerated offense, and is
“convicted of that offense or of another offense arising out of the
same set of circumstances.”91 Additionally, registration was
extended to offenses involving adult victims.92 Amendments
passed in 1996 broadened the scope of registration by requiring
registration of persons adjudicated as sexually dangerous or those
having sexual psychopathic personalities, regardless of whether the
person was convicted of any offense.93 The 1999 amendments
further expanded registration to include those persons found not
guilty by reason of insanity.94
87

Logan, supra note 5 at 1292-93.
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(1) (1991).
89
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5.
90
Logan, supra note 5, at 1294 (noting that the amendments greatly
expanded “the array of criminal behaviors” that would require registration).
91
Id. at 1294-95 (emphasis added); see MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(1) (1993).
92
Logan, supra note 5, at 1295; see MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(1) (1993).
93
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4(c) (1996). To be adjudicated as either “sexually
dangerous” or having a “sexual psychopathic personality,” facts must be
submitted to the county attorney who will prepare a petition if good cause is
shown. MINN. STAT. § 253B.185.1 (2003). A court will then hear the petition
alleging that the patient who is subject to commitment at a treatment facility is a
sexually dangerous person or is a person with a sexual psychopathic personality.
Id. See Logan, supra note 5, at 1306.
94
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4(d)(2) (1999); see Logan, supra note 5, at 1308
88
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Katie’s Law, a Minnesota statute passed in response to the
brutal kidnapping and murder of nineteen year old Katie Poirier,
resulted in a further expansion of the state’s registration laws.95
First, Katie’s Law stiffened the penalties for non-compliance with
registration requirements.96 Registration violations, including
failure to register address changes or return annual verification
letters, could extend the registration period by an additional five
years.97 The first violation of the statute subjects the offender to a
mandatory minimum sentence of one year in prison.98 A second
violation carries a minimum of two years incarceration.99
Additionally, Katie’s Law provided that if a person subject to the
registration requirement is out of compliance for thirty days, the
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension may disseminate
information about the offender, including a photograph, to the
public.100 The information released must be limited to that
necessary for the public to assist law enforcement in locating the
sex offender.101
Commentators have praised Minnesota’s Predatory Offender
(noting that the 1999 amendments were a legislative response to the acquittal,
for reasons of insanity, of a defendant who was charged with raping a thirteen
year-old girl).
95
MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2000); see Logan, supra note 5, at 1311-13
(noting that the defendant charged with Katie’s murder “had an extensive
history of sex offense convictions” but was not subject to registration and
community notification because these laws did not apply retroactively).
96
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5(a)-(b)(2000); see Logan, supra note 5, at 131314.
97
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.6(b) (2000).
98
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5(b).
99
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5(c).
100
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.7a. The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension may
make information available regarding offenders who fail to return their annual
verification letters or provide their primary or secondary residence to the public
through electronic, computerized, or other accessible means. Id. This publication
possibility applies to all offenders over the age of sixteen who have been out of
compliance for at least thirty days. Id.
101
Id. Minnesota’s registry presently contains over 11,000 registrants.
Klaas Kids Foundation, Megan’s Law by State: Minnesota, available at
http://www.klaaskids.org/st-minn.htm. Seventy percent are believed to be in
compliance. Id.

CEGLIANMACRO.DOC

862

4/23/2004 12:58 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Registration Act as being one of the “least onerous” in the
nation.102 Indeed, the ten year period of registration is comparably
shorter than most other states.103 In addition, unlike the registration
statutes of most states, Minnesota does not provide for automatic
public access to the information contained in the registry.104
Furthermore, registrants in Minnesota are only required to verify
their registration materials annually through a certified mailing, in
contrast to other jurisdictions that require verification of
registration materials in person and with greater frequency.105
In spite of the arguable moderateness of the provisions of
Minnesota’s registration statute, the statute as implemented reflects
an enduring rigidity.106 First, an offender is required to register
even if the original sexual offense charges are dismissed or
withdrawn and the offender’s remaining charge is a nonregisterable offense.107 Furthermore, Minnesota’s Bureau of
102

Logan, supra note 5, at 1322-23 (noting that “true to its reputation for
moderation in criminal justice issues more generally, Minnesota’s registration
and community notification laws rank among the nation’s least onerous in a
variety of respects”).
103
See Logan, supra note 5, at 1323. See also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 133821 (2003) (requiring lifetime registration after a conviction for sexual conduct
with a minor); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(6)(l) (West 2003) (requiring lifetime
registration for sexual predators); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-2(a) (Michie
2003) (mandating lifetime registration).
104
See Logan, supra note 5, at 1324 n. 286 (noting that Washington, D.C.
and New Mexico disseminate registrants’ employment addresses and that
Arizona provides a map that indicates the registrant’s home address and the
closest day care centers and schools); MINN. STAT. § 243.166.7 (2003)
(providing that registration data is considered “private data” and “may be used
only for law enforcement purposes”).
105
See Logan, supra note 5, at 1323 n. 279 (noting that Hawaii, Kansas,
and Michigan all require quarterly verification); MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4(e)(3)
(2003) (providing the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension shall send registration
information to registrants on an annual basis).
106
See Logan, supra note 5, at 1320 (noting that Minnesota’s law “numbers
among the nation’s most moderate in function and scope”).
107
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, 2000 Predatory Offender
Registration and Tracking Program, Minnesota Statutes Sections 243.166 and
243.167: Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://www.dps.state.mn.us
/bca/Invest/Documents/Frequently%20Asked%20Questions.pdf; see generally
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Criminal Apprehension (“BCA”) requires an offender to register as
a sex offender even if the registerable offense is expunged from his
criminal record.108 An offender can only be exempt from the duty
to register by obtaining a separate order expunging his registration
requirements.109 Finally, registration under Minnesota’s statute is
compulsory, thereby prohibiting the court from modifying a
person’s duty to register.110 The BCA provides that if a judge
exercises discretion and finds that an individual is not required to
register for a registerable offense, law enforcement and corrections
agents have the authority to circumvent the judge’s ruling.111 The
BCA directs those agencies to assist the offender with the
registration process in spite of a judge’s contrary ruling.112
Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Statute requires
the registrant to provide the citation for his original charges, his
relationship to the victim, the victim’s age, race, and sex, as well as
a brief description of his crime and past conviction record.113 The
registrant must read and initial all provisions contained in the
“Duty to Register” form, including an acknowledgement that it is
his “duty to register as a predatory offender” in accordance with
Minnesota law.114

Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639 (affirming Gunderson’s duty to register as a
predatory offender even though his predatory offense charge was dismissed in
its entirety).
108
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, 2000 Predatory Offender
Registration and Tracking Program, Minnesota Statutes Sections 243.166 and
243.167: Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://www.dps.state.mn.us
/bca/Invest/Documents/Frequently%20Asked%20Questions.pdf.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, 2000 Predatory Offender
Registration and Tracking Program, Minnesota Statutes Sections 243.166 and
243.167: Blank Forms, available at http://www.dps.state.mn.us/bca/Invest/
Documents/BlankForms.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
114
Id.
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III. VIABLE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO MINNESOTA’S
PREDATORY OFFENDER REGISTRATION STATUTE
While registration statutes have come under considerable
attack, they have thus far uniformly survived constitutional
challenges.115 Courts have sustained registration statutes against
equal protection,116 due process,117 and ex post facto challenges.118
In spite of the general reluctance to strike down registration
115

Licia A. Esposito, State Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Persons
Previously Convicted of Crime to Register with Authorities, 36 A.L.R. 5th 161
(2004 West Group). See, e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir.
1999) (upholding the Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act
against an equal protection challenge because the court determined that the Act
had a rational basis in protecting public safety with respect to sex offenses);
People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 2000) (holding that the Illinois Sex
Offender Registration Act, which required convicted sex offenders to register
with local police departments, did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right
to privacy); Byron M. v. City of Whittier, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(holding that the community notification requirements of the statute did not
violate either the ex post facto or double jeopardy clauses because the statute
was enacted to advance regulatory goals, including public safety and protection).
116
See Artway v. Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, 81 F.3d
1235 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that New Jersey’s statute mandating “repetitive
and compulsive” sex offenders to register with local law enforcement did not
violate the equal protection clause); see also Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174
(D. Mass 1998) (holding that the provisions of Massachusetts “Megan’s Law”
registration and disclosure requirements did not violate the equal protection
clause).
117
Patterson v. State, 985 P.2d 1007 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (upholding
Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act against a due process challenge finding
the statute rationally related to the legislature’s legitimate interest in promoting
public safety). See Akella v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716
(E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding that Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act did
not violate substantive due process rights despite the fact that the Act applied to
registrants who had been rehabilitated).
118
See People v. Guillen, 717 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (upholding
Sex Offender Registration Act against both federal and state ex post facto
challenges); see also Esposito, supra note 115, at *2a (stating that criminal
registration statutes have also survived challenges based on bill of attainder,
vagueness, right to privacy, right to travel, privilege against self-incrimination,
cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, and unreasonable search and
seizure).
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statutes, considerable due process concerns are raised when an
individual who has never been convicted of a sexual offense must
register as a predatory offender.119 Due process concerns arise
when “fundamental procedural fairness” has been denied or when
power is exercised “without any reasonable justification” in the
pursuit of an otherwise legitimate governmental objective.120
While the government undoubtedly has a valid objective in
protecting the public, the importance of such aims does not justify
trammeling constitutional due process protections.121
A. Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process protection provides notice of a possible
deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the government, and it
affords a meaningful opportunity to contest the deprivation prior to
its imposition.122 “The essence of due process is that a person in
jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the case against him and
opportunity to meet it.”123 In a procedural due process analysis,
therefore, the first inquiry is whether a protected liberty or property
interest is implicated.124
1. Implication of a Protectible Liberty Interest
A protected liberty interest is implicated when an individual is
required to register as a sex offender. For instance, the Ninth
Circuit held in Neal v. Shimoda that a protected liberty interest was
119

See generally, Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997).
People v. Bell, No. 3610-80, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 884, at *8-9 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2003) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80) (1972) (asserting that
the “central meaning” of procedural due process is clear—“parties whose rights
are to be affected are entitled to be heard”); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
331 (1986) (noting that the Due Process Clause was “intended to secure the
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government”).
121
See Doe v. Williams, 167 F. Supp. 2d 45, 59 (D.D.C. Cir. 2001).
122
People v. Bell, No. 3610-80, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 884, at *7-8.
123
Id. at *8.
124
In the Matter of Risk Level Determination of C.M, 578 N.W.2d 391,
396 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
120
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implicated where an inmate was dismissed of sex offense charges
and consequently was never given an opportunity to formally
challenge the imposition of the “sex offender” label.125 In that case,
Neal was indicted for robbery, kidnapping, sexual assault,
terroristic threatening, and attempted murder, but he entered into a
plea bargain in exchange for the dismissal of the sex offense
charges.126 Nonetheless, Neal was classified as a sex offender
because his indictment alleged that he engaged in sexual
misconduct during the course of his offenses.127 Neal challenged
this application, arguing that it violated his due process rights.128
The court found that indeed, this classification invoked due process
protections.129
To decide whether a protected liberty interest was implicated,
the court noted that state statutes may grant prisoners liberty
interests which invoke due process protections if the statutes
impose “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”130 Therefore, because of
the stigmatizing consequences of being labeled a sex offender, the
court found that this classification “is precisely the type of atypical
and significant hardship . . . that create[s] a protected liberty

125

Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 831 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 822. The complaint alleged that Neal, during a two-day period,
kidnapped and robbed the victim and forced the victim to perform sexual acts on
a juvenile. Id. Additionally, the indictment alleged that Neal sexually assaulted
the victim. Id. He was also indicted for kidnapping a second victim and sexually
assaulting her as well. Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 823.
129
Id. at 831.
130
Id. at 829 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). In
Sandin, Conner, a defendant convicted of numerous crimes including murder,
alleged that his procedural due process rights were violated because he was
denied the ability to present witnesses at a disciplinary hearing. Sandin, 515 U.S.
at 474-76. The hearing resulted in Conner being sentenced to thirty days’
disciplinary segregation. Id. at 475. The Supreme Court held that Conner’s
discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical,
significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty
interest. Id. at 486.
126
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interest.”131 These “increasingly popular ‘Megan’s laws’”
stigmatize individuals classified as sex offenders insofar as such
laws require that these individuals register with law enforcement
officials and information about the offenders may subsequently be
released to the public.132
In determining that Neal had a protected liberty interest, the
Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Vitek v.
Jones.133 In Vitek, inmates challenged the constitutionality of a
Nebraska statute that authorized correctional officials to classify
certain inmates as “mentally ill” without a hearing and to
subsequently transfer them to mental hospitals for involuntary
confinement.134 The Supreme Court held that the liberty interest
included both the characterization of the inmate as mentally ill and
the transfer of the inmate to the mental hospital.135 The Court also
concluded that an inmate’s criminal conviction and sentence,
alone, do not authorize the state to classify him as mentally ill and
subject him to involuntary confinement without affording him due
process protections.136 The Ninth Circuit found the parallels
between Vitek and the Neal case “striking.”137 First, Hawaii’s sex
131

Neal, 131 F.3d at 829. The court, however, emphasized the stigmatizing
consequences of sex offender registration statutes that authorize law
enforcement officials to release information to the public. Id. See also People v.
Bell, No. 3610-80, 2003 Misc. LEXIS 884, at *15 (“[A] defendant’s private
interest, his liberty interest in not being stigmatized as a sexually violent
predator, is substantial.”).
132
Neal, 131 F.3d at 829.
133
Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828 (9th Cir. 1997).
134
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 484-85 (1980).
135
Id. at 487-88 (affirming the district court’s holding that “characterizing
Jones as a mentally ill patient” and transferring him to a mental hospital had
“some stigmatizing” consequences that, when coupled with the mandatory
behavior modification treatment that Jones would have to undergo, “constituted
a major change in the conditions of confinement amounting to a ‘grievous loss’
that should not be imposed without the opportunity for notice and an adequate
hearing”).
136
Id. at 489-90. The Supreme Court noted that prisoners facing
involuntary transfer to a mental hospital must receive notice so that the prisoner
may be able to challenge the action and understand what is happening to him. Id.
at 496.
137
Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1997).
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offender registration statute authorized correctional officials to
classify an inmate as a sex offender without a hearing.138
Additionally, inmates classified as sex offenders were required to
complete a treatment program and confess to past sex offenses to
be eligible for parole.139 Therefore, the court could “hardly
conceive of a state’s action bearing more ‘stigmatizing
consequences’ than the labeling of a prison inmate as a sex
offender.”140
Using the analysis employed by the court in Neal, the
Gunderson court should have held that because classifying
Gunderson as a sex offender imposes substantial burdens on him, a
protected liberty interest is implicated.141 Like defendant Neal,
Gunderson was required to register as a sex offender, even though
all charges of sexual misconduct had been dismissed.142 Although
Gunderson was not required to complete a mandatory treatment
program, he still encounters substantial hardships from his duty to
register as a predatory offender. First, as a consequence of his duty
to register, Gunderson is not only required to register as a
predatory offender in Minnesota, but he must also register in each
state where he works or attends school.143 Gunderson’s foreseeable
reluctance to register as a sex offender in additional jurisdictions
restricts his mobility for the duration of his registration because
while Gunderson is not legally prohibited from leaving Minnesota,
he must comply with the registration laws of any state to which he
moves.144 Therefore, given that most jurisdictions provide for
138

Id. at 829.
Id.
140
Id.
141
Like Minnesota, registrants in Hawaii must provide law enforcement
officials with a recent photograph, verified fingerprints, all names and aliases
used by the sex offender, the legal address, mailing address, and any temporary
residence where the sex offender resides, the names and addresses of current
employers, the names and addresses of educational institutions, and the year,
make, model, color, and license plate of all vehicles owned or operated by the
sex offender. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 845E-2(b)(1)-(2), (5)-(7) (Michie 2003).
142
Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2003).
143
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4a(4)-(5) (2003).
144
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.9 (2003) (providing that when Minnesota
accepts an offender from another state under the interstate compact, acceptance
139
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public dissemination of information contained in the registry,
Gunderson will be significantly deterred from leaving Minnesota,
which does not provide for automatic public dissemination.145
Additionally, sex offender registration burdens registrants by
creating psychological barriers to travel.146 Should Gunderson
violate any of the provisions of his registration, he is guilty of a
felony and is subject to a mandatory minimum prison sentence of
one year.147
Furthermore, in Minnesota if a registrant is not in compliance
for over thirty days or if he does not provide his primary or
secondary address to law enforcement, his information including a
photograph can be released to the public.148 The stigmatizing
consequences can certainly be recognized in Gunderson’s case
where, although he was dismissed of all charges of sexual assault,
he is included on a sex offender registry and information
concerning an offense he was never convicted of may be released
to the public.149 As the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized,
is conditional on the offender agreeing to register under Minnesota’s predatory
offender registration statute). See also Lewis, supra note 57, at 113 (noting that
sex offender laws “burden the ability of released offenders to relocate”).
145
See supra Part II.A notes 70-73 and accompanying text (noting that
contrary to Minnesota, most states provide for public dissemination of
information contained in the registry).
146
Lewis, supra note 57, at 113-14. Indeed as noted by Judge Agid in State
v. Taylor:
[The requirement of registration] surely will have a chilling effect on
the [released offender’s] freedom of choice to move to a new place. It
is inconceivable to think that one who must, as his first act, go to local
law enforcement and announce that he is a felon convicted of a sex
offense will not be deterred from moving in order to avoid divulging
that ignominious event.
Id. (quoting State v. Taylor, 835 P.2d 245, 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (Agid, J.,
dissenting)).
147
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5(a)-(b) (2003). Gunderson was not subject to
mandatory incarceration following his conviction. Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 641642 (noting that Gunderson originally received three years probation with a
stayed sentence of fifteen months imprisonment).
148
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.7a (2003) (emphasis added).
149
Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding
Gunderson’s duty to register under MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2003)).
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“being labeled a ‘predatory offender’ is injurious to one’s
reputation.”150 Indeed, “imputing criminal behavior to an
individual is generally considered defamatory per se.”151
Minnesota’s sex offender registry clearly stigmatizes offenders on
the list insofar as it suggests that they are individuals convicted of
predatory offenses.152 In Gunderson’s case, law enforcement
authorities have branded him a predatory offender although he was
not convicted of a predatory offense.153 Gunderson must
acknowledge his status as a predatory offender for ten years in
spite of the fact that the complaint charging him with a sexual
offense was dismissed in its entirety.154 Therefore, because of the
potential for criminal sanction, the limitations on mobility, the
additional obligations imposed on Gunderson, and the stigmatizing
consequences of being labeled as a sex offender, registration as a
predatory offender imposes on Gunderson “atypical and significant
hardship,” which the Ninth Circuit held invokes due process
protections.155

150

Boutin, 591 N.W.2d 711 at 718.
Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 697). See also Neal v. Shimoda,
131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting the “stigmatizing consequences of
being labeled a sex offender”).
152
See Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2001),
rev’d on other grounds, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) “Publication of the Connecticut Sex
Offender Registry plainly stigmatizes the people listed on it insofar as it asserts
that they are persons convicted of crimes characterized by the State as sexual
offenses.” Id.
153
Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2003).
154
Doe v. Attorney General, 426 Mass. 136, 149 (1997) (Fried, J.,
concurring) (noting the distinct constitutional dangers inherent in registration
requirements as opposed to community notification provisions). While
community notification pertains to action on the part of law enforcement,
registration “forces an action on the person required to register. It is a
continuing, intrusive, and humiliating regulation of the person himself.” Id. at
150.
155
See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997).
151
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2. Gunderson’s Identification of a Protected Liberty Interest Under
the Stigma-Plus Test
In determining what procedural due process protections are
owed to an individual subject to a predatory offender registration
statute, some jurisdictions have examined whether a defendant has
suffered a loss of reputation in conjunction with the removal of a
protected status.156 This examination is often referred to as the
“stigma-plus” test.157 Damage to reputation, even if defamatory, is
insufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the due process
clause.158 Reputational damage must be combined with a tangible
element, such as loss of employment, to rise to the level of a
protectible property interest.159 The tangible element, however, is
not required to “meet some threshold of substantiality.”160
Registration duties imposed on the offender constitute a “plus”
factor under the “stigma plus” test when those obligations alter the
defendant’s legal status, are “governmental in nature,” and are
“extensive and onerous.”161 In addition to the reputational damage
suffered by Gunderson, compliance with Minnesota’s sex offender
registration statute alters Gunderson’s legal status.162 First,
156

See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 794 A.2d 1123, 1132 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). The stigma-plus analysis was
first articulated by the Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis. Justice Rehnquist noted
that an individual’s “interest in reputation . . . is neither ‘liberty’ nor ‘property’
guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of the law.” Id.
158
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 644 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701
(1976)).
159
Id.
160
Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d on
other grounds, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
161
Id. at 57 (affirming that the registration duties imposed on the plaintiff
constituted a “plus” factor because those obligations altered the plaintiff’s legal
status, were “governmental in nature,” and the registration duties imposed were
extensive and onerous).
162
Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Given that
registrants must comply with the registration requirements and are subject to
criminal prosecution for non-compliance, “there can be no genuine doubt that
registration alters the legal status of all offenders subject to the Act for a
minimum of ten years and, for some permanently.” Id. See Doe, 271 F.3d at 53
157
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Gunderson’s relationship with the criminal justice system has been
extended for an additional ten years, and “the extent of his contact
with the state has increased significantly.”163 Failure to comply
with registration obligations is punishable as an independent felony
offense.164 In addition, Gunderson is likely to be under the constant
supervision of local law enforcement officials.165 While the police
cannot arrest a registered sex offender based solely on his inclusion
within the registry, they can pressure him to come to the police
station and question him as a suspect.166 For example, if law
enforcement is investigating a sexual offense that occurred in the
vicinity of Gunderson’s home, there is little to prevent the
investigating authorities from questioning Gunderson, a registered
predatory offender, in connection with the crime. “If he is
suspected in connection with every sex crime in the area where he
lives, the costs to [his] liberty as well as the emotional and
financial costs are likely to be high.”167 As a direct consequence of
his placement on the predatory offender registration statute, unique
burdens are placed on Gunderson that ordinary citizens are not
required to endure.
In addition to altering a defendant’s legal status, registration
duties are undoubtedly governmental in nature.168 The Fourteenth
(stating that “the imposition on a person of a new set of legal duties that, if
disregarded, subject him . . . to felony prosecution, constitute a change of that
person’s status under state law”).
163
See Doe v. Williams, 167 F. Supp. 2d 45, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding
that “a sex offender’s status has undergone a fundamental change” under
Washington, D.C.’s Sexual Offender Registration Act considering that “his
relationship with the criminal justice system has been prolonged for at least ten
years, if not for life; and the extent of his contact with the State has increased
significantly”).
164
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5 (2003).
165
See Lewis, supra note 57, at 105 (noting that “sex offender laws will
likely make former offenders perpetual suspects of sex crimes committed in the
areas in which they live”).
166
Id.
167
Id. at 106.
168
Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 50 (2d Cir. 2001). The Due
Process Clause was established to guard against abuses in governmental power.
Id. at 56.

CEGLIANMACRO.DOC

4/23/2004 12:58 PM

REGISTERING NON-PREDATORY OFFENDERS

873

Amendment is implicated where a government official or agency is
able to “impose a loss” because of its unique status.169 In Doe v.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety, the Second Circuit found that registration
duties were governmental in nature “insofar as they could not be
imposed by a private actor in a position analogous to the state
defendants.”170 Because the BCA is entrusted with ensuring a
registrant’s compliance with Minnesota’s Predatory Offender
Registration Act and is given authority to “impose a loss” on
Gunderson, these registration duties are governmental in nature.171
Finally, registration obligations can be “extensive and
onerous.”172 The Appellate Court of Connecticut in State v. Pierce
found that the defendant satisfied the “stigma plus” test given the
burdensome requirements of Connecticut’s sex offender
registration statute and thus warranted the protections of
procedural due process.173 Connecticut law requires registrants to
verify their addresses annually for ten years.174 If an offender fails
to return an address verification form, a warrant may be issued for
the registrant’s arrest.175 The registrant must notify the
Commissioner of Public Safety five days in advance of an
anticipated change of address.176 Registrants must provide blood
samples for DNA analysis and photographs of the registrants must
be taken whenever the Commissioner so requests.177 Additionally,
Connecticut law mandates that the offender register in all states
where he regularly travels.178 Connecticut law imposes a maximum
169

Id. at 56.
Id.
171
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4(e)(2), .7a (2003) (providing that all registration
information including address verification forms must be submitted to the BCA
and if registrants are out of compliance with the statute for over thirty days, the
BCA may release registration information to the public).
172
Id. (noting that the provisions of Connecticut’s sex offender law are
“extensive and onerous”).
173
State v. Pierce, 794 A.2d 1123, 1133 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (upholding
Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001)).
174
Pierce, 794 A.2d at 1133.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
170
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five-year prison term if a registered offender fails to abide by any
of these obligations.179 The Pierce court found that these “onerous
requirements” clearly established a “plus” factor in the stigma-plus
analysis.180
With few exceptions, the provisions of Connecticut’s sex
offender registration statute mirror those of Minnesota’s statute.181
The penalties for non-compliance are identical.182 Both states
mandate registration in additional jurisdictions if the registrant
works or attends school in a different state.183 Such ongoing
obligations are significant restrictions on a registrant’s liberty and
freedom.184 Thus, while the Eighth Circuit alleges that the burdens
179

Pierce, 794 A.2d at 1133.
Id.
181
Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-254(a) (2003) (mandating registration
for a period of ten years and a five-day notice prior to any anticipated move)
with MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(4)(b)(3), MINN. STAT. § 243.166.3(b) (2003)
(mandating ten-year registration for predatory offenders and five-day notice
prior to any anticipated move). A fundamental difference between the two
statutes is that Minnesota treats registration information as private data whereas
Connecticut considers registration information a public record and makes
registry information available to the public through the Internet. See MINN.
STAT. § 243.166.7 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-258(a)(1) (2003).
182
Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-254(b) (2003) (violation of
registration provisions constitutes a Class D felony carrying a five year term of
imprisonment) with MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5 (2003) (violation of any
registration provisions is a felony subjecting a registrant to a maximum prison
sentence of five years).
183
Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-254(a) (2003) (providing that “if any
person who is subject to registration under this section is employed in another
state, carries on a vocation in another state or is a student in another state, such
person shall notify the Commissioner of Public Safety and shall also register
with an appropriate agency in that state”) with MINN. STAT. § 243.166.3(d)
(2003) (requiring a registrant who works or attends school outside of Minnesota
to “register as a predatory offender in the state where the person works or
attends school).
184
Boutin, 591 N.W.2d 711, 721 (Minn. 1999) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Judge Anderson noted that “the consequences of [Minnesota’s] Section 243.166
are serious” and it is because of grave implications that procedural due process
must be followed. Id. Additionally, Judge Anderson made these findings when
the penalty for non-compliance was merely a gross misdemeanor and not a
felony. Id.
180
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imposed by Minnesota’s statute are minimal, the statute, in fact,
imposes conditions that are both “rigorous and confining.”185
Therefore, the registration duties imposed on Gunderson under the
Minnesota statute constitute a “plus” factor, and he should be
afforded with the procedural protections of due process.186
The Gunderson court, however, dismissed the similarity of the
two statutes, stating that Connecticut, unlike Minnesota, provides
for public dissemination of registration data. Yet neither Pierce nor
Doe addressed this factor in their analyses; indeed, the Pierce court
affirmed that its holding was limited to the registration component
of the statute as opposed to the disclosure component.187
The Gunderson court also stated that because the Second’s
Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Dept. of Public Safety was reversed by
the Supreme Court, any persuasive value of that opinion has since
been eviscerated.188 The Second Circuit held that Connecticut’s
statute violated the Due Process Clause because registrants were
not afforded a prior hearing to determine whether they were likely
to be dangerous upon release into the community.189 The Supreme
185

See id. (noting that Minnesota’s section 243.166 imposes on registrants
conditions that are rigorous and confining).
186
Cf. State v. Pierce, 794 A.2d 1123, 1133 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (holding
that the defendant satisfied the “plus” factor of the “stigma plus” test where he
must verify his address annually for ten years, notify the Commissioner of
Public Safety within five days whenever he changes his address, and is subject
to a five-year prison term for non-compliance with these obligations).
187
Pierce, 794 A.2d at 1133. See Gunderson, 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003).
Contrary to the court’s belief, Minnesota’s statute does provide for public
dissemination of registration information if an offender is out of compliance for
over thirty days or if the offender has failed to provide a primary or secondary
address. MINN. STAT. § 243.166. 7a (2003).
188
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 644 (citing Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538
U.S. 1 (2003)). See Gwinn v. Awmiller, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 345 n.6 (10th Cir.
2004) (finding that the Supreme Court’s holding in Dep’t of Public Safety does
not foreclose a procedural due process claim brought by an individual who has
not been convicted of a sexual offense because the Court’s holding was limited
to individuals convicted of enumerated sexual offenses).
189
Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d,
538 U.S. 1 (2003). See Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (holding
that once a liberty interest is implicated, due process requires, at a minimum,
notice and an opportunity to be heard).
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Court reversed the Doe decision, finding that “due process does
not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material” to
the state’s statute.190 The Supreme Court pointed out that
Connecticut based the registration requirement on the fact of
previous conviction, not on whether convicted sex offenders were
likely to be currently dangerous.191 “The law’s requirements turn
on an offender’s conviction alone.”192 Respondent Doe was a
convicted sexual offender.193 Therefore, whether Doe was
currently dangerous was not material to the statutory scheme.194
What was material to the statutory scheme was Doe’s conviction—
“a fact that [Doe] has already had a procedurally safeguarded
opportunity to contest.”195 Gunderson, unlike Doe, has never been
convicted of a sexual offense, and whether Gunderson’s conviction
arose from the same set of circumstances as his charged criminal
sexual conduct presents an issue of material fact.196 The Eighth
Circuit improperly distinguished Doe and unreasonably refused to
apply Doe’s principle because unlike Doe, Gunderson was never
provided an opportunity to contest the imposition of the predatory
offender label.197 Therefore, due process entitles an individual
included on a sex offender registry who has not been convicted of
a sexual offense to a hearing to establish a material fact.198

190

Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S at 4.
Id. at 7. See also Chad Kinsella, State Government News May 1, 2003,
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS No.5 Vol.46 (May 1, 2003) (noting that the
Supreme Court found that the dispositive factor in being listed on Connecticut’s
sex offender registry was that an individual had been convicted of committing a
sex offense).
192
Doe, 538 U.S. at 7.
193
Id. at 5.
194
Id. at 7.
195
Id. (emphasis added).
196
See Murphy v. Wood, 545 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)
(stating that “whether Murphy’s convictions arose from the same set of
circumstances as his charged sexual misconduct presents an issue of material
fact”).
197
Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001); Gunderson v.
Hvass, 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003).
198
See Doe, 538 U.S. at 7.
191
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3. Deprivation of Gunderson’s Procedural Due Process
Protections
Given the harmful implications of denying a protected liberty
interest, defendants like Gunderson who have never been
convicted of an enumerated sexual offense must be accorded due
process protections.199 As noted in Neal, an offender who has an
identified protected liberty interest should receive advance written
notice of the claimed violation.200 Gunderson was not notified until
nearly a year after his conviction of his obligation to register as a
predatory offender.201 Gunderson’s registration requirement was
not stated on the record during his plea colloquy, nor is there any
evidence to indicate he was made aware of his obligation to
register prior to the execution of his plea bargain.202
Additionally, an offender should receive a written statement by
the fact-finders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for
requiring registration.203 Gunderson, much like Neal, was
classified as a sex offender based solely on the information
contained in his indictment and pre-sentence report.204
199

See Fullmer v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 207 F. Supp. 2d 650,
659-61 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding that the stigma of being falsely labeled on
the state’s sexual offender registry, coupled with the “obligations of registration
and the attendant penalties for non-compliance” were sufficient to implicate a
liberty interest).
200
Id. (noting that for “the minimum requirements of procedural due
process are to be satisfied” the defendant must receive an “advance written
notice of the claimed violation”).
201
Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2003). Gunderson was
made aware of his duty to register as a predatory offender following a violation
of his probation that occurred nearly a year after his conviction. Id.
202
Id. See Larry J. Richards, Criminal Procedure—Plea Withdrawal:
Grounds for Allowance—North Dakota Adopts the Minority Rule Regarding
Court Notification of a Sex Offender’s Duty to Register: State v. Breiner, 562
N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 1997), 74 N.D. L. REV. 157, 168 (1998) (noting that the
North Dakota Supreme Court held in State v. Breiner that trial courts must
notify defendants of their obligations to register prior to accepting a guilty plea
so as to ensure that the plea agreement has a factual basis and is voluntary).
203
See Neal, 131 F.3d at 831 (holding that these two elements are essential
if the minimum requirements of procedural due process are to be met).
204
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 642-43. See Neal, 131 F.3d at 822 (noting that
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Gunderson’s record lacked any specific findings as to the reasons
for his classification as a sex offender.205 An indictment, without
more, is an insufficient basis for imposing registration
requirements.206 “As tempting as it may be to make . . . finding[s]
based upon police reports and unverified statements, to do so is
improper.”207
B. Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process rights protect individuals against
governmental power that is either arbitrarily or oppressively
exercised.208 In analyzing a substantive due process claim,
infringements on personal liberty must be weighed against the
state’s desire to maintain stability in society.209 If Minnesota’s
predatory offender registration statute implicates a fundamental
right, the state must advance a legitimate and compelling interest
for abridging that right.210 The Minnesota Supreme Court has,
however, determined that the sex offender registration statute is
non-punitive, and therefore, because the statute does not implicate
fundamental right, the statute must only be rationally related to a
because Neal’s indictment and pre-sentence report alleged that he engaged in
sexual misconduct, he was classified as a “sex offender”).
205
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 642-43.
206
Neal, 131 F.3d at 831.
207
Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 721 (Anderson, J., dissenting). See also Murphy
v. Wood, 545 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). The court held that a
factual record was necessary to determine whether Murphy’s sexual assault
arose from the same set of circumstances as his convictions for aggravated
robbery and assault. Id. at 53. The court held that a copy of the criminal
complaint which the defendant denied was insufficient to establish a factual
record as to whether the sexual assault charge arose from the same set of
circumstances as the robbery and assault convictions. Id.
208
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (noting that “touchstone
of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
government”).
209
Lewis, supra note 57, at 102 (noting that “if the individual liberty
interests of former sex offenders outweigh the state interests in crime prevention
and law enforcement, the [sex offender registration act] violates the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of substantive due process”).
210
Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 643 (8th Cir. 2003).
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legitimate governmental purpose.211 While keeping track of
predatory offenders and protecting public safety are legitimate
governmental objectives, Minnesota’s Predatory Offender
Registration Statute is irrationally related to these objectives
because it mandates registration for individuals like Gunderson
whose sex offense charges have been dismissed and withdrawn.
Sex offender registration statutes have been justified on a
number of grounds. First, it is asserted that registration laws are
necessary because sex offenders have a higher risk of re-offending
after release from custody than other criminals.212 Second,
211

The Minnesota Supreme Court held, in Boutin v. LaFleur, that the
registration statute was non-punitive. 591 N.W.2d 711, 717 (Minn. 1999). To
reach this conclusion, the Boutin Court, along with most state and federal courts,
have applied the Mendoza-Martinez balancing test. Id. at 717. The MendozaMartinez balancing approach is utilized to determine whether a statute was
intended to be regulatory or punitive when the legislature has not clearly
indicated its intent. Id. In Kennedy v. Martinez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court
determined that factors used to determine legislative intent include:
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of a scienter, whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.
Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 717 (citing Kennedy v. Martinez-Mendoza, 372 U.S. 144
(1963)). In determining that the registration statute was regulatory, the court
noted that it does not require an affirmative disability or restraint, but that it only
requires the offender to register with law enforcement and to inform the state of
any change of address. Id. Additionally, such registration statutes have not
historically been regarded as punishment. Id. The Boutin court also noted that
the registration statute does not promote the traditional aims of punishment
because it does not involve confinement and that it is not intended to exact
retribution. Id. The court concluded that the statute did not implicate Boutin’s
fundamental rights. Id. But see In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914 (Cal. 1983) (finding
California’s sex offender registration statute punitive under the MartinezMendoza factors).
212
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-903 (Michie 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. §
45-33-21 (2004). A recent study issued by the Justice Department, however,
revealed that sex offenders are less likely to be re-arrested after their release
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registration laws are considered an invaluable tool in protecting the
public from sex offenders.213 Third, the privacy interests of
convicted sex offenders are considered less important than the
government’s interest in public safety.214 Each of these
justifications, however, presupposes that the individual subject to
the registration statute is in fact a sexual offender. It is irrational in
light of those objectives to classify an individual as a predatory
offender when the complaint charging that individual with a sexual
offense has been dismissed and withdrawn by the prosecution.
Contrary to the Magistrate’s assertion, inclusion in the
predatory offender registry of persons who are not predators is a
fatal constitutional defect.215 Designating Gunderson a sex
offender when there is no sexual element to his crime leads to an
illogical and absurd result.216 As it stands, the statute is overinclusive given that it demands registration of persons convicted of
only non-sexual offenses and thereby fails to achieve the primary

from prison than other criminals. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, (2003)
available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf. Of 9,691 men
convicted of various sex offenses, only 43 percent were re-arrested within three
years as compared to 68 percent for all other former inmates. Id. See also MARY
ANN FARKAS & GEORGE B. PALERMO, THE DILEMMA OF THE SEX OFFENDER
171-72 (Charles C. Thomas 2001) (noting that there is no clear evidence to
indicate whether sex offenders have higher recidivism rates than other
offenders).
213
Klaas Kids, supra note 3. The articulated purpose of Minnesota’s Sex
Offender Registration Statute is aimed at “assist[ing] law enforcement in
keeping track of predatory offenders and protect[ing] public safety.” Minnesota
House of Representatives, House Research: Predatory Offender Registration,
available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/ssinfo/ssporeg.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2004).
214
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-903 (Michie 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. §
45-33-21 (2004).
215
See Magistrate’s Report at *25 (asserting that “the fact that such a
registration policy may, in fact, require the inclusion of persons who are not
predators, is not a fatal Constitutional defect”).
216
See State v. Reine, 2003 Ohio 50, ¶ 22 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that labeling individuals as “sexually oriented offenders” is unreasonable and
arbitrary when their offense involved no sexual motivation or purpose”).
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purpose of the statute—to protect the public from sex offenders.217
Indeed, the primary purpose of the statute is disserved by sweeping
within its provisions individuals who are clearly not predatory
offenders because these offenders pose no risk to society.218
Nothing prevents the legislature from imposing registration
requirements on all convicted felons.219 However, “it is in the
misnaming or mis-characterization, of the offense that is
unreasonable and arbitrary.”220 Minnesota’s predatory offender
registration statute violates substantive due process rights even
under a rational basis review because it irrationally classifies an
individual as a predatory offender when all predatory offense
charges have been withdrawn due to a complete lack of physical
evidence.221 By enacting the 1993 Amendments, the Minnesota
Legislature “was attempting to insure the registration of all
predatory offenders including those who take advantage of
favorable plea bargains.”222 While this is certainly a valid
legislative goal, it is highly doubtful that through these
amendments the legislature intended to expand the predatory
offender registry to include persons who did not commit a sexual
offense.

217

See MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2003).
Reine, 2003 Ohio at ¶ 20. As noted by Connecticut State Senator Donald
E. Williams, co-chair of the judiciary committee and majority whip, having a
registry where 75 percent of those on the list are not sexual predators is not a
great help to individual citizens or local law enforcement who are trying to be
apprised of those who will be dangerous to the community. Turner, supra note
78.
219
Reine, 2003 Ohio at ¶ 21.
220
Id. at ¶ 23 (noting a hypothetical situation where a legislature, in an
effort to protect public safety, enacted a statute designating all persons convicted
of felonies as “murderers,” with registration and notification requirements so
that neighbors would be notified that John Jones, a “murderer,” is living on their
block when in fact John Jones was convicted of an esoteric election-law felony).
221
See Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2003).
222
Magistrate’s Report, supra note 47 at *25.
218
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IV. ADDITIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF MINNESOTA’S PREDATORY
OFFENDER REGISTRATION STATUTE
In addition to the constitutional impediments posed by
Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Statute, the statute
raises several other problematic consequences. First, by mandating
registration based solely on the charges contained in the initial
complaint, the prosecution possesses an unchecked ability to
determine whether a defendant will ultimately be required to
register. Even if there is little evidence to support this charge, so
long as the prosecution has charged a sexual offense, an individual
will be required to register as a predatory offender. Additionally,
Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Statute will lead to
the ultimate decline of plea bargaining given that the threat of
compulsory registration leads many defendants to seek jury trials
rather than plead guilty.
A. Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion
An alarming consequence of Minnesota’s Predatory Offender
Registration Statute is the enormous degree of “unchecked power”
given to the prosecution.223 Registration duties arise solely from
the allegations contained in the original complaint.224 Regardless
of whether the complaint is subsequently dismissed or amended, if
the original complaint charged an offender with a registerable
sexual offense, that offender is required to register as a predatory
offender for a minimum of ten years.225 As noted by Judge Randall
in State v. Newell:
223

See Minnesota v. Newell, 2002 WL 31253657, at *6 (Minn. Oct. 8,
2002) (affirming the defendant’s duty to register as a predatory offender while
appreciating “the enormity of the potential unchecked power this statute, as
written, places in the hands of the prosecution”).
224
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 643 (noting that since Gunderson’s original
complaint charged a sexual offense he was required to register as a predatory
offender in accordance with Section 243.166).
225
MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(b)(3) (2003) (requiring an offender to register
as a predatory offender until ten years have elapsed since that individual was
released from confinement).
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In some criminal sexual conduct cases, the state’s case
against the defendant weakens so significantly that the state
will agree to bargain down from a serious sexual-assault
charge to a misdemeanor such as simple assault . . . .
Defendants may consider it prudent to accept a plea-ofguilty to a lower-level misdemeanor charge rather than go
through the uncertainty of trial on an egregious sexual
assault charge. Yet, the stigma of the original charge
remains (meaning the registration requirement), even
though it is now self-evident that the original charge did not
result in a conviction . . . . Put another way, this is one of
the few times in American jurisprudence where the “charge
is the conviction,” meaning that once you are charged with
an enumerated felony under the statute, you are convicted
of having to register.226
While the prosecutor has unrestrained discretion to determine what
offenses to charge in the indictment, however, once the indictment
is filed, the prosecutor herself is unable to withdraw the
registration requirements.227 As the Gunderson case illustrates,
once a prosecutor issues a complaint that contains a registerable
offense, even if the prosecutor subsequently withdraws the original
complaint, an individual must still register as a predatory offender
based solely on the allegations contained in the original withdrawn
complaint.228 This places significant power in the hands of
prosecutors, allowing them to impose severe penalties associated
with registration compliance without ever putting forth any
evidence to prove that the individual committed the charged sexual
offense.
B. Effects on the Plea Bargaining System
In addition, Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration
226

State v. Newell, 2002 Minn. App. Lexis 1153, *7 (Minn. Ct. App.

2002).
227

Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 642 (asserting that registration is required so
long as a predatory offense is charged even if the predatory offense charge is
subsequently withdrawn from the complaint).
228
Id.
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Statute will lead to the gradual decline of plea bargaining.229
Defendants who plead guilty to non-predatory offenses will
rightfully fear that they may be subject to mandatory registration if
the original complaint charged a predatory offense.230 This
apprehension is well-placed, given that the Minnesota Supreme
Court operating under the majority view has determined that the
statutory duty to register as a sexual offender is a collateral rather
than a direct consequence of a guilty plea.231 “For a guilty plea to
be intelligent, the defendant must be aware of the relevant
circumstances and direct consequences of the plea.”232 A direct
consequence of a plea has a definite, immediate, and automatic
effect on a defendant’s term and condition of sentence.233 Because
most states find that the requirement to register is regulatory rather
than punitive, registration requirements are not considered to be a
direct consequence of a guilty plea.234 Thus, unlike a direct
consequence, these jurisdictions do not require that a defendant be
warned of a collateral consequence before entering a guilty plea.235
229

See Turner, supra note 78 (noting that the plea bargaining process will
be slowed down by a defendant’s apprehension that he will be required to
register as a sex offender).
230
Id.
231
Kaiser v. State, 621 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). A direct
consequence of a guilty plea is a consequence that flows “definitely,
immediately and automatically” from the guilty plea. Id. The court in Kaiser
held that because the predatory offender registration requirement is regulatory
and non-punitive, it is collateral to the plea agreement, and therefore, a
defendant cannot withdraw his plea agreement simply because he was not made
aware of his obligation to register as a predatory offender. Id.
232
Id.
233
Richards, supra note 202, at 161-62.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 168 (noting that “many appellate courts view the consequence of
registration as a sexual offender to be collateral, so that a trial court’s failure to
advise defendants of the need to register does not constitute grounds for
allowing a withdrawal of a guilty plea”). But see In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12, 17
(Cal. 1973) (finding registration as a sex offender to be a direct consequence of
a guilty plea, given that registration subjects registrants to “continual police
surveillance” and can result in an “ignominious badge” that can last for a
lifetime). Because registration prolongs a defendant’s relationship with the state,
and because it subjects a defendant to an independent felony offense and to
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Unfortunately, the failure to warn a defendant of his duty to
register does not allow the defendant to subsequently withdraw his
plea.236
If states can arbitrarily impose registration requirements on
defendants, unbeknownst to them, after a plea bargain has been
struck, defendants will be wary of entering into plea negotiations,
and will opt instead to seek a jury trial. In an amicus brief filed in
the case of In re Reed, the Los Angeles City Attorney asserted that
the threat of mandatory registration leads defendants to seek jury
trials rather than plead guilty, even if evidence of their guilt is
overwhelming.237 Through a jury trial, a prosecutor is forced to
advance evidence of the sexual offense and if the jury finds this
evidence unconvincing, a defendant will be relieved of the
registration requirement. In a system where approximately 96
percent of cases are resolved through plea bargains, such a
disruption could have a devastating effect in terms of judicial
economy.238 If a state deems it necessary to label a defendant as a
sex offender and to subject him to registration requirements, the
state should pursue prison terms that correspond to the offense,
rather than dismissing sex offense charges pursuant to a plea
bargain and yet still subjecting the defendant to registration

constant police surveillance, registration should be considered as a direct
consequence of a guilty plea. Therefore, defendants should be notified of the
requirement to register as a predatory offender prior to entering a guilty plea.
236
See Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900 (Minn. 2002), construed in the
Magistrate’s Report, supra note 47. Indeed, Gunderson alleged that at the time
of his plea, he was not informed of his obligation to register as a predatory
offender and that if he had been informed of this obligation, he would never
have accepted this plea bargain. Magistrate’s Report, supra note 47, at n.5. See
Minnesota v. Andersen, 2001 Minn. App. Lexis 1346 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)
(prohibiting defendant’s withdrawal of her plea agreement in spite of the fact
that her plea was conditioned on the district court’s belief that she would not
have to register as a predatory offender).
237
In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 220 n.7 (Cal. 1983) (holding that California’s
registration requirement constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
238
Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft Limiting Prosecutors’ Use of Plea Bargains,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003 (noting Attorney General John Ashcroft’s efforts to
restrict the ability of federal prosecutors to strike plea bargains in response to the
“dangerously lenient practices” of certain federal prosecutors and judges).
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requirements as if he were convicted of the sexual offense.
V. RECOMMENDATION
To comport with procedural and substantive due process,
Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Statute should be
reformed to provide offenders who have never been convicted of
an enumerated sexual offense with a hearing to challenge inclusion
on a sex offender registry.
“When protected liberty interests are implicated, the right to
some kind of hearing is paramount.”239 This procedural protection
was denied to Mr. Gunderson.240 Providing courts with the
authority to make discretionary determinations regarding
registration, ensures that the predatory offender registry is limited
to those offenders whose inclusion is necessary to promote public
safety. Given the predominance of plea bargaining, prosecutors
often dismiss sexual offense charges to secure a plea bargain on a
lesser charge.241 Nonetheless, registration as a sex offender is
required although the sexual assault charges have never been
adjudicated.242 Minnesota’s unique “arises out of the same set of
circumstances” provision mandates that a defendant charged with
an enumerated felony and subsequently convicted of any crime,
even a mere misdemeanor, must register as a predatory offender.243
If a court deems that an offender’s conviction has “arisen out of the
same set of circumstances” as a charged predatory offense,
registration should not be compulsory; instead it should be
239

Neal, 131 F.3d at 830.
Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003).
241
See State v. Johnson, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 323 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000). The defendant was charged with one count of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct and one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Id. at *2. In
exchange for his guilty plea to a charge of promotion of prostitution by fraud,
the defendant received a stayed sentence and his sexual assault charges were
dropped. Id. at *3.
242
Id. See also Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003); Neal v.
Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997); Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711
(Minn. 1999).
243
Logan, supra note 5, at 1333.
240
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imposed at the court’s discretion. Therefore, all defendants who
have not been convicted of an enumerated predatory offense must
be provided with a hearing to contest their classification as a
predatory offender.244 At this hearing, the defendant should be
provided with an opportunity to call witnesses and present
evidence to defend against the charge that his offense arose from
the same set of circumstances as a charged predatory offense.245
Additionally, in determining whether to require registration, the
court should consider the offender’s criminal history, his risk of reoffense, the circumstances surrounding the charged sexual offense,
whether registration would promote public safety, and any other
relevant evidence.246 Finally, the burden should be on the state to
prove that the offense for which the defendant was convicted of
arose out of the same set of circumstances as a charged predatory
offense.
This procedural reform would not disturb the defendant’s
underlying conviction,247 but rather, would enable the trier of fact
to consider individualized circumstances when deciding whether to
impose registration obligations. For example, Gunderson never
admitted to any charges of criminal sexual conduct and extensive
physical evidence demonstrated a lack of sexual contact between
the defendant and the complainant.248 Therefore, if the court were
sufficiently convinced that the predatory offense did not occur, it
could not be said that Gunderson’s ultimate conviction arose out of
an enumerated predatory offense, and the court could exempt
Gunderson from the registration obligations.249 Therefore, a
244

See discussion sufra Part III.A.3 (discussing procedural due process
protections owed to sex offender registrants).
245
Neal, 131 F.3d at 831 n.14.
246
See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6 § 178K (2)(d) (2004). See also Dep’t of
Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 10 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that
Connecticut permits courts to exempt certain sex offenders from registration and
notification requirements of the statute).
247
State v. Pierce, 794 A.2d 1123, 1133 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
248
Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2003).
249
For example, in Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Minn. 1999),
the defendant admitted to police that he had forcible sexual intercourse with the
victim, stating that “she said she didn’t want to and I still did it I guess.” Id.
Presumably, it was only because the victim recanted her accusations of criminal
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discretionary hearing safeguards the due process rights of
defendants while promoting the law’s primary goals—“keeping
track of predatory offenders and protecting public safety.”250
Reform of Minnesota’s registration statute through the addition
of an opportunity for a hearing is in accord with the greater degree
of procedural protection already afforded by other states that
mandate registration for general categories of behavior that exceed
specifically enumerated offenses.251 For example, in California, if
a court orders the registration of an offender because it finds the
offense was committed as a result of sexual compulsion or sexual
gratification, the court must state on the record the reasons for its
findings and the reasons for requiring registration.252 In Kansas,
while registration may be imposed on defendants whose offenses
were sexually motivated, the court must determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime was in fact sexually motivated.253
A reform in the statutory scheme that would allow courts
discretion in imposing registration requirements is also consistent
with recent judicial trends. For example, a New York court
recently held that where an individual is charged with a
registerable offense that does not contain a sexual element, a
decision concerning registration should be left to the discretion of
the courts. A defendant is provided a hearing to determine if his
sexual conduct that Boutin was able to plead guilty to the charge of third-degree
assault. Id. Therefore, in this instance, it is conceivable that Boutin’s ultimate
conviction for assault arose out of the same set of circumstances as an
enumerated predatory offense. Id.
250
Judie Zollar, Predatory Offender Registration, House Research,
Minnesota House of Representatives, Predatory Offender Registration (2002),
available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/issinfo/ssporeg.pdf.
251
CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(2)(E) (Deering 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22-4902(c)(14) (2002); W. VA. CODE § 15-12-2(c) (2003).
252
CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(2)(E) (Deering 2004).
253
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(c)(14) (2002). See W. VA. CODE § 15-122(c) (2003) (while the statute mandates registration if the crime was sexually
motivated, the sentencing judge must make a written finding that the offense
was sexually motivated). See Pierce, 794 A.2d at 1128 (noting that under
Connecticut’s sex offender registration statute, if the defendant is required to
register because the court finds that his crime was committed for a felony
purpose, the decision to require registration is discretionary).
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crime had a sexual element. 254
CONCLUSION
“The touchstone of due process is the protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of the government.”255 Due
process is denied when an individual who has not been convicted
of a predatory offense is labeled a predatory offender and then
denied an opportunity to challenge his inclusion on a predatory
offender registry.256 Sex offender registration laws such as
Minnesota’s continue to enjoy overwhelming popular support
given the societal condemnation of sex offenders and the fear
engendered by their actions.257 In order for such laws to be
constitutional, however, they must recognize the rights of those
who fall prey to them. While it has been said that “it is a fair
summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice
people,” individuals required to register under Minnesota’s
Predatory Offender Registration Statute are nevertheless entitled to
both procedural and substantive due process as provided by the
Constitution.258
Given the heavy burdens imposed on registrants under
Minnesota’s Predatory offender registration statute, offenders like
Gunderson who have never been convicted of a sexual offense
254

People v. Bell, No. 3610-80, 2003 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 884, at *34 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 30, 2003) (holding that where classification as a sex offender is
mandatory but the crime itself does not contain a sexual element, the defendant
must be afforded a hearing to determine if his crime had a sexual component).
See also State v. Reine, 2003 Ohio 50, ¶ 22 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding that
mandatory classification of certain offenses as sexually-oriented, which do not
contain a sexual element, is unreasonable).
255
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (noting that prisoners
were entitled to procedural due process protections in disciplinary proceedings
that could result in the forfeiture of their good-time credits).
256
See discussion sufra Part II.A.3.
257
FARKAS, supra note 212, at 166-67.
258
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from the majority’s holding that reasonable searches
conducted without a search warrant pursuant to an arrest were permissible).
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should be provided with a hearing to challenge their classification
as a predatory offender. At the hearing, the burden must be on the
State to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that the crime
the defendant was convicted of did in fact arise out of the same set
of circumstances as the charged sexual offense. Additionally, the
State must make clear what governmental interests are furthered by
labeling an individual who has never been convicted of a sexual
offense a predatory offender. While ensuring that children do not
fall prey to violent sexual predators is of the utmost importance, if
states continue to mandate registration of alleged sexual predators
without regard to the reality of the offense, American
jurisprudence will become the predator and the rights of potentially
innocent offenders will become the prey.

